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ABSTRACT
The recent upsurge of interest in the co-articulation of biopolitical
and bioethical entanglements underpin both a concern for the
putatively temporal thresholds of human life and the very
conception of a bounded humanity itself. Taking a step further, I
want to suggest that micro(chimerism) as a very speciﬁc form of
somatic multiplicity, read together with the contemporary
rethinking of the concept of immunity, instantiates a fundamental
disordering of linear temporality. And that in turn calls for a
further reconceptualisation of conventional bioethics. I
acknowledge the force of an existing postmodernist bioethics that
has attended to the materiality and viscerality of the body and
challenged the meaning of human being but, until recently, it has
not addressed the bookends of life and death. Once the teleology
of the life course is contested, however, death is no longer an
insult to being, but merely one event constituting an ongoing
vitalism. I propose an atemporal bioethics of coexistence rather
than one of successive existence that is faced always with its own
ﬁnitude.
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… biological discourses have not yet had adequate feminist intervention, have not yet been
strongly enough disturbed by the questioning of feminist theory. And feminist theory has pro-
tected and insulated itself from any incursions into biology through the fear, indeed paranoia,
surrounding the question of essentialism, though biology is one of the few disciplines able to
adequately contest essentialism. (Grosz 2010, 50)
I preface this article with a quote from Elizabeth Grosz that highlights the reluctance of
feminist scholars to engage with biology, and the potential of biology itself to subvert
the very essentialism that it is assumed to represent. The somataphobia that she refers
to has been a long-standing facet of feminist theory though nowhere near as universal
as we might suppose. The claims of new materialism to refocus on the substance of the
body – and of much else besides – diminishes a vibrant strand of feminist thought that
has always taken the biological sciences seriously, albeit it as a minority interest. Yet
given that feminist theory is committed to contesting the seemingly rigid hierarchies
and oppositions of the Western logos, and anticipates that things could be otherwise,
then an excursion into the biosciences may prove invaluable in grounding a range of
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philosophical, political and socio-cultural speculations and actions. The rethinking of bio-
logical orthodoxies, particularly with regard to the existence of a singular genetic proﬁle of
what counts as human, has come together with the co-articulation of biopolitical and
bioethical entanglements that underpin both a concern for the putatively temporal
thresholds of human life and the very notion of species boundaries. In the biosciences,
the relatively recent emergence of bioscientiﬁc work on the human microbiome and on
microchimerism, together with a concomitant upsurge of interest in the concept of immu-
nity across political, philosophical and cultural spectrums, opens up a radical contestation
of the dimensions and signiﬁcance of human being.
In the humanities, the concept of the immunitary paradigm – originally prominent in
the work of Jacques Derrida on autoimmunity and compellingly taken up by Roberto Espo-
sito – has returned to its socio-juridical roots, while investigations in the biological sciences
around a similar conundrum of what is at stake in the distinction between self and non-
self, and what follows from the failure of distinction, have resulted in a new acknowledg-
ment of the genetic diversity of all bodies. There are many implications to explore, but in
this article I want to suggest that (micro)chimerism, as a very speciﬁc form of somatic mul-
tiplicity, that ties in with the contemporary rethinking of the concept of immunity, instanti-
ates a fundamental disordering of linear temporality. And that in turn calls, amongst other
things, for a further reconceptualisation of the conventional bookends of life and death,
and suggests a new ecology of life. Once the teleology of the life course is contested,
however, death is no longer an insult to being, but merely one event within a greater
sphere of an enduring vitalism. The bioethics of such a conception has yet to be
thought, and the speculations that I oﬀer here are at best preliminary, but what can be
anticipated is a move away from a thanatoethics, where death is always imminent, to a
more aﬃrmative mode that concerns itself with the persistence – even the un-timeliness
– of dynamic expansiveness.
I will start by providing a very basic introduction of the concepts of chimerism and
microchimerism as they have recently become prominent in the biological sciences and
biopolitical thought. Classically, chimerism is understood as a combination of forms,
either intraspecies or transspecies, that nevertheless retain genetic and usually morpho-
logical distinctions within a single body. Chimerism at the level of whole bodies represents
the conventional use of the term, but it is nowhere near as ubiquitous as the unseen
microchimerism that occurs at the cellular level and has limited impact on morphology.
Strictly speaking microchimerism indicates that no more than 1 in 1000 cells is genetically
distinct from the majority, but in some cases such cells may come to predominate in a par-
ticular organ as well as circulating in low numbers throughout the body. As Dupré remarks:
Chimeras do not necessarily experience any unusual symptoms, so the prevalence of full chi-
merism, chimerism derived from multiple zygotes, is not really known, and may be much
higher than suspected. (2010, 22)
Unlike a hybrid, such as a mule, which is the genetically assimilated oﬀspring of a horse
and a donkey, a true chimera, such as a geep, maintains the unique signature of the dis-
tinct genetic components of the parent sheep and goat in a patchwork of cells. In other
words, in a hybrid each cell consists in a combination of genes, while in a chimera each
individual cell will contain genes from only one of the originating organisms. In short,
the tissues of a chimera are populated by cells that are genetically distinct from each
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other. In consequence, a mule – whose interspecies chromosomes cannot form the
necessary pairs – is unable to breed,1 while a female geep can theoretically give birth
to either a lamb or a kid depending on which genes predominate in the reproductive
gametes. The two categories, hybrid and chimera, both contest the separation of self/
non-self and disrupt the expectation of genetic singularity. However, my concern here
is with a rethinking of temporality, which is not directly troubled by the sterility of a
hybrid, except insofar as it is a reproductive dead-end.
In conventional evolutionary terms, microchimerism is an ancient phenomenon widely
detected in plants and invertebrates as well as many vertebrates and mammals including
monkeys, cattle, dogs and humans. In human beings, a range of both iatrogenic and
natural chimeric states exist, with biomedical interventions such as organ or stem cell
transplantations constituting the former, while the latter includes the fusion of dizygotic
twins in utero into one body or the more common incidence of foetal cell engraftment
into the maternal body, and vice versa. Whatever the provenance, such transformations
challenge ‘the traditional evolutionary dogma for the dominancy of genetically hom-
ogenous entities in nature’ (Rinkevich 2011, 1). Bioscientiﬁc explanations for the existence
of chimerism and microchimerism are disputed. But this has transformative implications
for our conventional model of distinct biological objects, including ourselves as human
beings, where each organism is coincident with a single genome. What is at stake, at
very least, is the principle that DNA is suﬃciently stable across individuals and over inter-
generational time to provide a reliable guide to the genetic basis of human health, disease,
and diﬀerence. But as Lappé and Landecker note: ‘(a)s genomic instability becomes an
area of increasing focus for life scientists, it opens up a new landscape of genomic multi-
plicity and temporality in health and disease’ (2015, 161).
More importantly, if research into microchimerism has the capacity to shake the bio-
sciences, then it is equally deconstructive of some fundamental structures of modernist
philosophy, which feminist and postcolonial thinking has already delighted in undermin-
ing. The contestation of the Western logos, in which undivided masculinist individuality
reigns supreme, has long been underway from what I would cautiously call a feminist
standpoint. But this critique has rarely escaped the bounds of humanism, nor has it
engaged with more than a highly circumscribed mode of knowledge production.
However, this is where the growing recognition of genomic variation can take us: some
further steps along the route to posthumanism. Not as a nebulous plaything that might
oﬀer some better ways of becoming but as the inevitable outcome of some very material
and often highly pragmatic research. As feminist theorists we have to push the ‘so-what?’
question to its limits and perhaps even contemplate that there are no limits.
The theorisation of (micro)chimerism seems to me to be one clear way of opening up
the terrain, as does the somewhat more familiar awareness of the dimensions of the
human microbiome. In the latter case, we should remember that the microbiome has
been the focus of state-sponsored research on a massive scale in the US. The benign
public aims are all about understanding how changes in the microbiome aﬀect health
and disease – and one can only speculate with foreboding the military uses that the
research may support – but as always there are some highly radical and largely unspoken
implications that could paradoxically disrupt both monolithic power structures and the
very sovereignty of human beings that generate the parameters of the research in the
ﬁrst place. What is being rapidly established is that the human body, far from having
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one exceptional genome that marks it as superior to other organisms, is a complex admix-
ture of bacterial, fungal, parasitical and viral components on a cellular level in which the
strictly human cell (or rather the human as previously understood) is vastly outnumbered.
The ratio of human to nonhuman genetic material may be very low, and there are esti-
mated to be around 10,000 microbial species living in the body, mostly in the gut (National
Human Genome Research Institute 2012). It is diﬃcult to make the case that animals,
including human beings, are individuals in the anatomical sense, and it may be that
microbes, measured by cell number, constitute approximately 90% of human bodies
(Gilbert, Sapp, and Tauber 2012). This percentage is constantly being revised both
upwards and downwards2 but neither move makes a diﬀerence to the basic argument:
that we are materialised as genetically multiple. There is no steady state and each individ-
ual has a unique microbial makeup that interacts both with the external environment and
within the body between diﬀerent microbial communities. The paradox is that as a
supraorganism, the human being is both denied conventional individuality, biologically
based on a singular genetic code, and aﬀorded an absolute uniqueness by the complexity
of the intra-active microbial communities.
The language in which the microbiome enters into socio-cultural awareness is still
biased towards militaristic metaphors such as ‘competing armies’ but the science reveals
a high degree of cooperation and mutual beneﬁt. In fact many microbes are unable to
survive outside the body, just as the human being herself could not survive and develop
without maintaining an active microbial viscera. As becomes obvious, infants are not
born with a genetically predetermined microbiome; it is acquired over time. Although
they do, of course, inherit many aspects of their parental makeup, the teleology of succes-
sive generations passing down deﬁnitive genes is disrupted. In place of a neat heredity mix
of male and female chromosomes that underpin the genetic makeup of the next gener-
ation, there is genomic ﬂuidity that continues throughout life, with older people having
somewhat diﬀerent genomes to their younger selves. I am not who I was. Most of us are
unable to verify such claims for ourselves and they may seem to have minimal eﬀect on
our lives, so does it really matter whether we are able to identify a singular genome?
There are of course immediate implications for health and disease, which range from the
emerging ﬁeld of faecal transplants, which ﬁnds its rationale in the microbiome, to my
own ongoing research around organ transplantation, the success of which may turn out
to be deeply intertwined with microchimerism. And more widely, anything that involves
genetic testing as an absolute arbiter of biological ‘truth’will require revision. Themost pro-
found argument, however, is that the impact of such knowledge must eventually disorder
the socio-cultural imaginary of the autonomous, clearly deﬁned and temporally situated
individual. Certainly in the global North, our faith in genetic identity is practically unchal-
lenged, so I’d like to recall a couple of puzzling but compelling stories that have reached
the popular media, long before any bioscientiﬁc explanation has been widely accepted.
The ﬁrst case was initially reported in a 2013 issue of Psychology Today, a magazine that
pitches in the space called ‘public understanding of science’, and concerns the disturbing
story of an American woman, Lydia Fairchild, whose maternity of her own ‘natural’ child
could not be veriﬁed through genetic testing when she submitted a blood sample as
part of a stringent welfare application. She was under suspicion for some time before
giving birth to a further child. Despite surveillance witness testimony that she had
indeed delivered the baby, and had not utilised any reproductive technologies that
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broke the genetic link between carrying mother and infant, the child’s DNA ‘proved’ that
Lydia Fairchild could not be the mother. The case was ﬁnally resolved when it emerged
that she had profound chimerism to the extent that the DNA of her blood (which was
initially tested) was quite diﬀerent to the DNA of her reproductive organs. Her genetic
proﬁle, in other words, was at least dual and possibly multiple (Kean 2013).3 The most
likely explanation is that the woman was the result of a dizygotic twin conception that
had disappeared from knowledge when her embryonic self had absorbed the other
twin in utero. The resulting singleton carried both her own original DNA and that of the
non-identical twin, thus creating a chimera. Research in the area of uterine chimerism is
still sketchy, but there are many suggestions that the phenomenon might explain intersex
conditions, even the phenomenology of transgendered people (Hanley 2011), or at a
diﬀerent level, the observation that some people have eyes of diﬀerent colours.
The second case concerns the much-delayed publication of an Australian report about
an emergency liver transplant carried out in a nine-year-old female child, whose whole
immunological response realigned itself with that of the male deceased donor, with her
blood group switching from O-negative to O-positive (Alexander et al. 2008).4 In the dry
circumscribed style of bioscientiﬁc journals, the clinical paper reports that ‘(t)he patient
remains well [ﬁve] years after transplantation. She has not received any immunosuppressive
therapy for [ four] years, and the results of her liver-function tests are normal’ (Alexander
et al. 2008, 371, my emphasis).5 The authors oﬀer various tentative explanations for the
surprising absence of what is called graft-versus-host disease, particularly as the transplant
liver came, unusually, from a ‘fully HLA-mismatched, sex-mismatched’ emergency
donation (Alexander et al. 2008, 373).6 It is usually assumed that the long term success
of transplantation supposedly depends on careful, though never complete, tissue match-
ing and the extent to which the recipient’s immunological rejection of the donor organ, in
which the antigens of the recipient body seek to destroy the antigens of the graft, can be
controlled by a life-long mix of immunosuppressant drugs. In the Australian case, however,
the chance discovery at nine months post-Tx of extensive chimerism during investigation
of a small bowel obstruction led to a decision to withdraw all immunosuppressant medi-
cation. This enabled the donor cells over the next few months to eﬀect a full, and thera-
peutically beneﬁcial, engraftment, which resulted in the patient’s eventual full recovery.7
In an earlier and seemingly isolated paper, Starzl et al. (1992) had already traced the
occurrence of cell migration from a donor organ (where the ‘alien’ DNA is supposed to
stay in situ) to the recipient’s peripheral blood supply and claimed that microchimerism
might be a factor in graft acceptance. Most subsequent studies, however, avoided upset-
ting orthodoxies and defended against claims of experimental contamination by asserting
that that although the process ‘is common following liver transplantation… it usually dis-
appears within the ﬁrst 3 weeks’ (Alexander et al. 2008, 372). Alexander’s Australian case,
however, could scarcely be called one of microchimerism, in which the percentage of ‘non-
self’ cells is very low, but a full-scale transmutation in which an assay of 250 peripheral
blood cells at post-transplantation day 492 showed ‘all of these cells were male’ (Alexander
et al. 2008, 371). Although the authors are highly cautious in oﬀering any analysis of the
case, perhaps understandably given the extent of their unsettling of biomedical givens,
there is no doubt that their paper raises some urgent questions. Such a startling demon-
stration of genetic translocation, even in its rarity, suggests an intriguing new understand-
ing of intracorporeal malleability, a recognition that borders are permeable, and that
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genetic origins may be far from secure. The dominant fantasy of a pure, uniﬁed and
unchangeable identity established at conception and secure until death begins to
dissolve.
I want now to make the connections to the second term in my title, immunity. Its indis-
soluable and superﬁcially antagonistic links with chimerism nevertheless points the way to
an aﬃrmative biopolitics and a new ecology of life that forces a rethinking of temporality.
Where chimerism and microchimerism undo the binary and hierarchical nature of self/
other, the conventional understanding of immunity, whether in biology, politics or
ethics, is that it is precisely the science of self/nonself discrimination. The term has a
long history in the sphere of juridical politics to ﬁgure the one who is immune as
exempt from certain communal obligations and laws (Cohen 2009). In its more recent
usage in biomedicine it signals protection against threats to the integrity of the body
and, following Macfarlane Burnet’s work in the 1940s, a belief in the apparently natural
antagonism of the self/non-self cellular relation. In other words, it speaks to the mainten-
ance of the boundaries between the supposedly normal self and the pathological other.
Unless artiﬁcially suppressed, the immune response is supposedly activated whenever
the body encounters ‘foreign’ antigens, and its task is to mobilise an array of biochemical
agents that eliminate the putative threat of otherness. In the mid-twentieth century, Peter
Medawar had identiﬁed the immune system as the operative destroyer of hypothetically
palliative non-self tissue. In the light of the relentless graft rejection experienced by injured
post-war military personnel who required skin grafts, Medawar was motivated to ﬁnd ways
of securing induced immuno-tolerance. His endeavour was largely unsuccessful, but he
did identify and name the phenomenon of enduring dizygotic twin chimerism in
certain non-human mammals8 and even very rarely in humans, which he was able to
link to natural immuno-tolerance. Medawar himself was perplexed by such occurrences,
calling them a ‘natural accident’ and ‘astonishing’ (1960), and the insight was not
further developed. Several more of his observations have been superseded, but what
remains is the doxa of an apparently natural antagonism of the relation between self
and non-self cells.
For many decades now, the immune system, as a feature of the biomedical imaginary,
has evoked a series of pugnacious metaphors: on the one side invasion, outright warfare
and intruding foreignness, and on the other a range of counter self-defence mechanisms,
such as the body’s own Natural Killer (NK) cells. This characteristic language of biomedical
knowledge has been widely explored by many feminist scholars such as Donna Haraway
(1989, 15), for whom such notions of a threatened self indicate that ‘individuality is a stra-
tegic defense problem’ in order to expose what is at stake in maintaining boundaries
between the supposedly normal self and the pathological other. Emily Martin (1990),
Lisa Weasel (2001) and more recently Susan Kelly (2012) have all commented on the emer-
gence of the speciﬁc discourse of immunology, while Polly Matzinger (2001)9 has, like
Haraway, oﬀered an alternative model. Nonetheless, although the familiar image of con-
frontation has been progressively undermined by research ﬁndings that do not ﬁt the
embattled self-defence model, the very same metaphors still dominate popular discourse.
As I have noted before, the problem,
is that while the body’s immunological counter to the putative threat of otherness in the form
of a bacterial infection, or even a carcinoma, might understandably evoke images of steadfast
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defence, its hostile reaction to many therapeutic interventions such as tissue and organ trans-
plants, skin grafts, or bone marrow implants creates biomedical as well as metaphorical
trouble. (Shildrick 2015, 97)
In any case, the efﬁcacy and binary closure of the self/non-self model takes no account of
some notable and widely accepted anomalies. The most compelling of these include the
phenomenon of autoimmunity where the body’s own cells are seemingly misrecognised
and responded to as other; the growing evidence of microchimerism following transplan-
tation; the commensal microbial life in the gut; and the evidently natural tolerance
between a pregnant woman and her foetus, despite their different HLA coding. As
Emily Martin notes, the imagery of immuno-warfare waged against foreign intruders
implies that the body is uniformly self-identical, ‘hence the normal woman would
destroy her foetus to return to a normal state of internal purity’ (1990, 148). Clearly, this
is not how the reproductive process proceeds and what is slowly emerging more
widely is a shift, equally across biology and immuno-politics, from the notion of rigid
and enduring corporeal boundaries, both external and internal, to permeable and leaky
bodies.
Like every other authoritative discourse, bioscience invests in strategies of represen-
tation that ﬁnesse the empirical data to ﬁt a particular discursive structure. I am not claim-
ing, as Cohen (2009) wants to do, that the juridico-political concept of immunity has been
inappropriately transplanted into an otherwise natural set of phenomena called biology.
As a good Derridean, if not a good new materialist,10 I would reject that split between
culture and nature, and see the two as codependent with no pure origin on either side.
The point that Cohen makes, that the hypothesised late uptake of the concept of immu-
nity by biology in relation to the human body naturalises the modernist subject as an inde-
pendent entity necessarily engaged in self-defence, is nevertheless usefully provocative. It
makes clear the intimate intertwining of our domains of knowledge production and raises
the issue of how things could be Tierney 2016, otherwise.11 I suggest that the rapidly
growing evidence of those scenarios that do not ﬁt the oppositional self/non-self para-
digm, that throw into question not just the protective/defensive operations of the
immune system, but the modernist normative context in which the inviolability of clear
corporeal boundaries between self and other is taken as a given, presage perhaps a
subtle shift in the imaginary itself. As Aryn Martin (2010) notes with regard to the micro-
chimerism of foetal material in the maternal body, and vice versa, the bioscientiﬁc
language that describes the process is slowly changing from metaphors of alien intrusion
or invasion, which ﬁt with conventional immunological discourse, to that of productive
migration. Similarly, the circulation of non-identical DNA post-transplant and the whole-
sale visceral transformations that chimerism implies indicate not simply intercorporeality,
but the irreducibility of embodiment into singular and static forms. If once the standard
expectation would have been that such incursions could not be tolerated long-term
without pathological consequences, there are now at least some indicators of beneﬁcial
eﬀect. We might wonder if we could think of such cellular translocations as oﬀering a
diﬀerent model that extends far beyond the privileging of modernist forms of human
being. The signiﬁcance is that if self and other are no longer distinct, if the very rigidity
of the terms suggests a certain incoherence, then it is not just the space of the body
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that is contested but the time of the body too. What does it mean for a body (whose body?
which body?) to die?12
In the next section, I shall look a little more closely at these issues through the concept
of autoimmunity, which is the site at where the interface between immunology and chi-
merism appears most exposed. If immunity stands for the self-defensive rejection of alien
intrusion, and (micro)chimerism speaks to the coexistence of self and other, then it would
seem that the latter portends a puzzling failure, or at least inaction, in the former. Unless
artiﬁcially suppressed as in organic transplantation, the biological immune response is
supposed to be activated whenever the body encounters ‘foreign’ antigens, and its task
is to mobilise an array of biochemical agents that eliminate the putative threat of other-
ness. As the obvious manifestation, however, of a self/other interface interior to the
body, healthy pregnancy does not provoke the theoretically expected immune response.
Substantial research in recent years has shown beyond any doubt that not only does foetal
DNA enter the mother’s body, but maternal DNA crosses the placental barrier in the oppo-
site direction, without obvious pathological eﬀect. This inconvenient observation of the
intra-active circulation of maternal-foetal cells has been traditionally dismissed as being
of very short duration and therefore insigniﬁcant in terms of ongoing health. More
radical research, however, has shown that mismatched maternal and foetal DNA can
remain in the mother or oﬀspring’s body for decades after pregnancy (Bianchi et al.
1996; Maloney et al. 1999), a phenomenon that demonstrates how the biological event
of pregnancy has a temporal resonance far beyond the limited nine-month conjunction
of maternal and foetal selves. Even more startling has been the discovery that women
who have never been pregnant can carry male DNA that is, their XX cells have companion
XY cells (Yan et al. 2005). As I have previously outlined (Shildrick 2015), this clear demon-
stration of microchimerism linked to reproduction, though I stress that it is only one area of
observation, has provoked an going split between clinical researchers who insist that it is
linked to pathologies and those who believe that it may have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on health.
Could it be possible then to think immunity and microchimerism in positive conjunction?
The testing ground for both sides of the argument is in the ﬁeld of what are classed as
autoimmune diseases, such as lupus, rheumatoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis. Here, the
immune response is not directed against externally invading antigens (the aggressive
language is all but unavoidable), but against its own self-components. For those who
believe that microchimerism is always pathological, the discovery of signiﬁcant evidence
of non-self DNA at the site of lesions conﬁrms their negative understanding. For the as-yet
minority who see microchimerism as potentially protective and beneﬁcial, the same evi-
dence indicates that non-self cells migrate to sites of disruption to bolster and multiply
the protective immunological responses. Indeed, there is emerging evidence that autoim-
munity may not be the intrinsically self-destructive phenomenon that has long been
assumed but that in addition to its pathological outcomes it may also serve a regular
and necessary homeostatic function. In recent work, philosopher of biology, Thomas
Pradeu (2012) has turned away from the atomistic self-identical understanding of the
body to suggest an ecological model of highly heterogeneous and mutually assistive
elements that autoreact to internal and external stimuli alike, and display high degrees
of immuno-tolerance. His aim as he puts it, ‘is to open up the immune system to its
environment instead of viewing it as exclusively self-centred’ (2012, 204). This ﬁts precisely
with the now recognised function of the microbiome, and in Pradeau’s view autoimmunity
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is no less routinely beneﬁcial. Perhaps surprisingly, Pradeau claims that the actions of the
immune system are what secure the unity of the organism as a biological individual, but
not its uniqueness. This is a reversal of how I would understand the data, in which – as my
earlier comments on the microbiome indicate – increasing degrees of heterogeneity
intensify uniqueness.
Autoimmuity is concurrently proving a powerful discourse in the co-articulation and co-
constitution of philosophy, politics and biology. Aside from a few exceptions like Pradeau,
the focus has been more in line with traditional biomedicine in trying to theorise it as a
turning against the self. In his Introduction to Roberto Esposito’s text Bios: Biopolitics
and Philosophy, Timothy Campbell lists the many critical theorists working on the
concept of immunity and claims that ‘the term quickly folds into autoimmunity, becoming
the ultimate horizon in which contemporary politics inscribes itself’ (Esposito 2008, viii). In
Esposito’s own use, what he calls the immunitary paradigm both protects and endangers
the individual and socio-political collectives alike, but he is wary of too easily conﬂating
immunity with autoimmunity. Immunity itself, through its shared Latin root munus, is
intrinsically tied up with the concept of community such that the one cannot be
thought without the other. The issue for political philosophy is that where the function
of immunity is to protect life against external incursions, to ensure the continuity of com-
munity and selfhood, the risk lies in falling into an absolute refusal of diﬀerence which
signals the decomposition of immunity into a highly damaging autoimmunity. In the
attempt to preserve personal or communal identity (and remember the root word idem
means ‘the same’) transformation is rejected and a kind of death-like stasis ensues. As
Esposito (2006) sees it, the individual may feel the necessity to immunise herself against
the demands and obligations of community life, isolating herself from what would
sustain her. Far more damaging, however, is the collapse into a thanatopolitics, which ulti-
mately sacriﬁces life and embraces death rather than be open to heterogeneity. For Espo-
sito, as with many other European philosophers such as Agamben, the horriﬁc unfolding of
National Socialism is the prime example of thanatopolitics. In short, the Nazi project of
immunising Aryan life was operationalised through the large-scale production of death,
not only for the countless Others who were categorised as a threat to the illusory purity
of the Reich, but ultimately for the Reich itself. The fear is that many politicians worldwide
are again engaging in just such ruined strategies around the question of refugees and
asylum seekers.13
It is important to note, nonetheless, that Esposito does not see it as inevitable that
immunity degrades into autoimmunity. He too references the maternal-foetal relationship
as an aﬃrmative mode of conceptualising immunity. As he writes:
[it becomes] the ﬁgure of a cohabitation with diﬀerence, an emblem for a diﬀerent means of
thinking about community. This is most literally introduced with a reference to biologists who
think of the immune system as an ecosystem or a social community – not just a defensive
system, but a system of ‘self-alteration’. (2011, 169)
And he believes that the only way to defer death, to, in effect, disorder temporality, is to be
‘reborn continually in different guises’ (2008, 181). The ﬁnitude and limits of mortality
would be superseded precisely by the recombinatory intra-action of immunity. There is
no evidence that Esposito has ever considered microchimerism as such but his conclusions
are precisely what microchimerism effects. What Esposito explicitly seeks is an afﬁrmative
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biopolitics that sees hope in forestalling autoimmunity, while for Derrida, in contrast, the
trajectory is unavoidable. In biology, as he notes, the process of autoimmunisation ‘con-
sists for a living organism… of protecting itself against its self-protection by destroying
its own immune system’ and he posits what he calls a ‘general logic of autoimmunization’
that extends to every community (Derrida 2003, 94).
I ﬁnd Derrida’s work extremely rich in its implications and, although the precise term
autoimmunity is most associated with his response to the deadly event of 9/11 and its
aftermath, it runs as a theme through his texts long before. The whole concept of the
‘other within’, which is fundamental to Derridean thought, and his understanding of the
relation between the host and the guest in his analysis of hospitality sets up a model in
which the self is never ﬁnally secure. In Spectres of Marx, for example, Derrida writes:
to protect its life… [the self] is necessarily led to welcome the other within… it must there-
fore take the immune defenses apparently meant for the non-ego, the enemy, the opposite,
the adversary and direct them at once for itself and against itself. (1994, 177)
It is as though autoimmunity is the spectre that never ceases to haunt the self, and it
comes at the possible cost of instantiating the monstrous, of exposing the self to autodes-
truction. Now this seems as though it would preclude any afﬁrmative bioethics, that it
would necessarily fracture life and posit death at the heart of all being. Derrida does
indeed refer to our present ethics as thanato-ethics (1993, 60) but it would wrong to
suppose that he sees autoimmunity as wholly negative with death as an implacable
end. On the contrary, the very spectrality that characterises his texts and disrupts identity
to the self speaks to a very different take on temporality, not as teleology, but as irregular
and unpredictable traces and recurrence. Autoimmunity, for Derrida, is unavoidable but at
the same time it is what holds open not simply the question of alterity now but the very
possibility of futurity, the undecidable a-venir where we cannot know who or what will
come. As he puts it: ‘Without autoimmunity… nothing would ever happen or arrive; we
would no longer wait, await, or expect, no longer expect one another, or expect any
event’ (2005, 152).
It is not, I think, that Derrida is any less desirous of the aﬃrmative than Esposito but that
he refuses to prise apart what is positive and what negative. In this respect his work on
hospitality, which is intimately related to the question of immunity, is highly apposite.
For Derrida the ethical imperative is to oﬀer an absolute hospitality with no ifs and
buts, no limiting provisos as to whom or what our thresholds should be open. But that
means welcoming not just those who conventionally appeal to our better community
instincts, but also welcoming the monstrous arrivant; the refugee who may turn out to
be a terrorist, the one who may bomb our city centres or murder us in our beds. But
the real point of course, as Derridainsists, is that absolute hospitality is both necessary
and impossible. Because we cannot avoid immunising ourselves against others and
falling into autoimmunity, our future horizons are undecidable, potentially destructive
and monstrous and the point of positive aspiration. In an article comparing Esposito’s
and Derrida’s understanding of autoimmunity, Penelope Deutscher sums it up like this:
‘It is because we are open to disaster that we are open to transformation. But the
reverse also must hold. If we are open to transformation, we are open to disaster’ (2013,
63). I whole-heartedly agree but would want to reverse the emphasis of her equation.
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Earlier I raised the question of what it means for a body to die, and now the most cogent
question becomes: is death a disaster? On a personal level, it may always be understood
that way and without doubt biomedicine will continue with its eﬀorts to prolong life, to
stave oﬀ the inevitable cessation of breathing, and that is precisely what drives the
research on immunity and microchimerism. Most of us are at one with the Western
logos understanding of death as an end. When Heidegger described life as ‘being
toward death’, he reﬂected our immersion in human exceptionalism and questions of
authenticity and mortality. For Derrida, however, the aporia of death suggests something
else, ‘which no longer has the form of the movement that consists in passing, traversing or
transiting’ (1993, 8). So what does it signify for death if the materiality, the viscerality of our
own bodies is inherently and irreducibly multiple? And what if, as I’ve been suggesting, the
anticipated temporal predictability of chrononormativity (Freeman 2010) were displaced
by a non-sequential mode of becoming? Chrononormativity seems to usefully encapsulate
the parameters of trauma, death and mourning which I see as dependent on the closed
frameworks within which life course as conventionally understood. That is, the temporal
processes of reproduction, kinship, inheritability, and lineage within relatively stable
social structures and power relations. (Micro)chimerism and a new thinking of immunity
disrupt all those things, with the span of a life (what life? whose life?) no longer self-
evident; with conception and gestation being the site of intensive microchimeric
exchanges and immuno-tolerance; with kinship claimed between transplant donors and
recipients across age, race and ethnicity; with the dimensions of genetic inheritability
and lineage radically multiplied not simply between humans but across species. Although
the focus remains the human body, the move towards a posthumanism is inexorably
underway. And as Esposito notes: ‘Flesh is constituitively plural, multiple and deformed.
It is… from this point of view that one can begin to imagine an aﬃrmative biopolitics’
(2006, 52). It speaks to a new ecology of life.
On a theoretical level, the move that is emerging is away from a philosophy of biology
that tries to pin down the essence of life, to a biophilosophy ‘concerned with articulating
those things that ceaselessly transform life’ (Thacker 2015, 126). In other words, the project
is to elaborate a hitherto unregarded network of relations that dispenses with the bound-
aries of singular location and time and reimagines the concept of living outside oneself. In
an embodied hauntology, the other is always within, but equally the self (if we can still call
it that) externalises its becoming. If the conditions for ethical agency are not dependent on
the present normative structures, could we think an atemporal bioethics of coexistence
rather than one of successive existence that is faced always with its own ﬁnitude? As
Tierney concludes: ‘rather than redeeming, or worse, defeating death, an aﬃrmative bio-
political stance ought to embrace death as it does life, as a gift’ (2015, 20). Rather than
fearing death, could an aﬃrmative biopolitical stance embrace death as potential? At
very least the rethinking of microchimerism and immunity entails a diﬀerent kind of
ethics where we should actively seek to ‘enter into modes of relation with multiple
others’ (Braidotti 2015, 34). And there is no reason to stop at human others. Once we
acknowledge that life and death itself is unlimited in its material manifestations, and
that all forms of existence, human and non-human, are intra-active at levels beyond
regular control, then there are no grounds for privileged distinctions between one
living entity and another. In short, we do not have to accept that the conditions for political
and ethical agency are dependent on the normative structures that currently surround us.
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For Braidotti this clearly implies a shift of temporal gears, and she makes the point that
once we get away from oppositional thought, we are no longer ‘tied to the present by
negation. Ethical relations… are the driving forces that concretize actual, material
relations and can thus constitute a network, web, or rhizome of interconnection with
others’ (2015, 35). Our possible futures are yet to be explored, but as Braidotti insists:
What is positive in the ethics of aﬃrmation is the belief that negative aﬀects can be trans-
formed. This implies a dynamic view of all aﬀects, even the traumas that freeze us in pain,
horror, or mourning. (2015, 51)
Without a reimagined temporality, we are stuck with the somatic facts of pain, death and
mourning, but the narrative need not end there. It is ﬁnally about the extent to which we
can rethink the modernist boundaries of selfhood and embrace the possibilities of trans-
formation. In the non-teleological time of becoming, the insults of being may be less
acute.14 And really it is not a choice but simply the ecology of life, whether human or
otherwise. The risk and vulnerability of life and the fractures in personal teleology are una-
voidable, and we cannot simply choose interdependence. Rather they all exemplify the
chimerical context in which we live. And that speaks to both a familiar destructive and
yet generative potential, which we have hardly begun to explore.
I will give the last word to Grosz (2004, 14): ‘the more clearly we understand our tem-
poral location as beings straddling the past and the future without the security of a stable
and abiding present, the more transformation becomes conceivable’.
Notes
1. Very rarely, a female mule may produce oﬀspring although the incidence is almost negligible.
The problem is that horse and donkey chromosomes are suﬃciently unalike to adequately pair
up in the gametes and, that as there are 63 parental chromosomes, there is always one that
remains unpaired.
2. Recent National Geographic ﬁgures suggest that ﬁgures have been wildly over-estimated and
that the ratio may be as low as 1:1 (Greshko 2016).
3. See also Yu et al. (2002) and Norton and Zehner (2008) for a highly bioscientiﬁc report of a
similar phenomenon and a cultural studies take respectively.
4. See also Rotman (2008) for a popular science commentary on the case.
5. Immunosuppression is usually life long after transplantation supposedly to prevent an
immune reaction in which the antigens of the recipient body would seek to destroy the anti-
gens of the donor organ.
6. HLA – Human Leukocyte Antigens – are the major agents of the immunological system and
are coded for and expressed by a group of genes on a single chromosome.
7. It is not the case that clinical evidence of the translocation of genetic material is limited to a
single direction. By studying female to male donations, Quaini et al. (2002) show how a heart
graft may be genetically transformed by the incorporation of the recipient’s existing markers.
Unlike the systemic chimerism studied by Alexander et al. (2014), the chimerism here (ident-
iﬁed by the ‘out of place’ presence of Y chromosomes) occurred within the heart itself. Once
again, however, and contrary to existing doxa, the suggestion is that this unexpected chimer-
ism ‘could regenerate myocardium and sustain cardiac performance’ (Quaini et al. 2002, 5).
8. A recent report in PNAS, announcing the newly sequenced genome of the marmoset monkey
refers to its ‘unique’ capacity to produce ‘dizygotic twins that exchange hematopoietic stem
cells in utero, a process that leads to lifelong chimerism’ (Harris et al. 2014). This is odd as
Medawar himself, referring to earlier work by R.D. Owen in 1945, was well aware of the
similar process in dizygotic twin cattle (Medawar 1960).
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9. While I have some reservations about Matzinger’s ‘danger model’ of the immune system, it does
speak to an enhanced ecological understanding. Rather than launching a general onslaught
against all non-self elements, ‘(w)e become a habitat, welcoming the presence of useful com-
mensal organisms and allowing the passage of harmless, opportunistic ones’ (2001, 8).
10. Pace Jamieson (2015), who argues that it is new materialism that challenges the putative dis-
tinctions made by Cohen. Though I broadly agree with her, the same conclusions can be
reached via a feminist uptake of Derrida and others that applies the deconstructive drive to
substantive contexts.
11. See Goﬀey (2015) for a helpful overview of the relation between bioscientiﬁc and humanities
understanding of immunity.
12. I am reminded of Dolly the sheep, cloned from her ‘mother’ at the Roslin Institute in 1996.
When she died well before the normal life span of her breed, which sheep exactly had
expired?
13. I am acutely aware, however, of Derrida’s warning that the immunity paradigm makes us all
complicit: that in seeking to immunise communal life, it is too easy to demand the regulation
of immigration and asylum, as Derrida adds ‘as they say they do, unanimously, on the left and
on the right’ (Derrida and Stiegler 2002, 19).
14. This clearly goes in the direction Deleuzian philosophy which I have explored in a similar mode
elsewhere (see Shildrick 2015).
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